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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to review a final order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah—Board of Review denying Plain-
tiff benefits for a period of fifty-two weeks and assessing 
the Plaintiff with the liability to repay $1,217.00 received 
by Plaintiff during such period of disqualification, and 
declaring him inelgible to receive future benefits until 
full repayment is made by Plaintiff to the Department of 
Employment Security. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff submitted a signed statement regarding 
his claims for benefits on January 7> 1976. He W E S served 
with a notice of hearing and appeared before a Hearings 
Representative on February 17, 1976. The decision on Plain-
tiff's future rights to Unemployment benefits was rendered 
March 2, 1976. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeal Referee and 
a hearing was held April 14, 1976. From a decision affirming 
the prior decision, Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Review, 
wherein the prior decisions were affirmed in an opinion ren-
dered June 30, 1976. This appeal is taken from that final 
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
for the State of Utah. 
REIIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff filed this Writ of Review seeking 
reversal of the Order of the Commission and & ruling and 
determination by this Court thc.t Plaintiff shall be elgible 
to receive future benefits during such times as he may be 
1 
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unemployed and elgible to receive benefits; that Plaintiff 
shall be declared not inelgible to receive benefits for the 
period beginning May 31, 197 5, for fifty-two weeks thereafter; 
and that the decision assessing a liability for overpayment 
in the amount of $1,217.00 be reversed and otherwise set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed as a carpenter during all 
times material to this appeal. He is a member of the Car-
penters Union, Local 184, and was sent out on jobs through 
the union as work became available. During the four calendar 
quarters beginning with the fourth quarter of 19743 Plaintiff 
was employed by 7 different employers for a total of 22 weeks. 
Plaintiff was mailed Form 6C5, Notice of Monetary Determina-
tion on January 5, 1976, and was determined elgible for 
benefits. (Appendix page 1.) 
Plaintiff was requested to submit a Statement 
Regarding Claim for Benefits, Form 6l5-C. (R. 2 1) It does 
appear that this form was completed by a representative of 
the Department of Employment Security, and signed by the 
Plaintiff. It was noted thereon that "the claimant speaks 
broken English and seems confused about Unemployment In-
surance in general." (R. 21) The scope cf that inquiry 
was apparently limited to a question of whether plaintiff 
was employed on May 30, 197 5. Plaintiff was earning$7.6l 
per hour at that time. He stated that he could have earned 
about $55.00 per day during that period of time. He further 
stated that if he had worked on that day, that he did not 
know why it could have gone unreported on his claim for 
benefits for that week. 
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On February 10, 1976, plaintiff was mailed a 
notice to attend a hearing on February, 17, 1976, in order 
to determine whether he had violated provisions of Section 
35-4-5 (e) U.C.A. 1953. (R. 18) The decision of the Hearings 
Representative rendered March 2, 1976, concluded that plain-
tiff had failed to report working on May 30, 1976, and did 
further conclude that plaintifffs conduct constituted a 
knowing withholding of a material fact. As a consequence 
plaintiff was disqualified from receiving benefits for the 
52 week period beginning with the week ending May 31 * 1975 • 
As a consequence of the disqualification, the benefits paid 
to plaintiff during various periods of unemployment after 
that date, and prior to the date of hearings, were "over-
payments", and plaintiff was determined to be liable for 
the immediate repayment of those amounts. 
At that hearing plaintiff contended that he did 
not withhold material information in order to receive benefits. 
On April 14, 1976, plaintiff appeared before the 
Appeals Referee and testified again concerning the date of 
employment. He was examined by the Referee. The transcript 
made therefrom appears at the Record, p. 11-15. The line 
of questioning by the Referee was essentially similar to 
that of the Hearings Representative. 
It was established that plaintiff had begun 
work for the McKee Construction Company on May 30, 1975, 
and that he was laid off due to reduction in force on July 1, 
1975* and that he thereafter made additional claims for 
benefits. Plaintiff again denied wilfully failing to 
report the fact of being employed for the one day, and for 
being entitled to receive the amount of $^~.0? T ' — - ^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reported that amount, even though he had not yet been paid. 
It appears that the inquiry described hereinabove 
was based upon inquiry of the Department of Employment 
Security to McKee Construction dated November 20, 197 5. 
(R. 22) Reference is made throughout the findings of 
the Agency representatives to information"subsequently 
developed" that plaintiff may have worked for one day which 
was not reported. It also appears that no other notice was 
forwarded to plaintiff concerning the inquiry of McKee. 
In spite of the fact that plaintiff has con-
sistently denied a wilful and knowing withholding of 
information, and stated that he had made a mistake on 
his claim card for the week in question, the decisions 
were adverse to him. It appears that some considerable 
weight was placed on the fact that he had received the 
"handbook" from the Department, and that on at least two 
prior ftccassions involving partial benefit weeks, the 
plaintiff had correctly filled out his claim cards. 
It was observed by the Referee that the finding 
of overpayment results in a very severe penalty, but was 
of the opinion that the statute does not vest any discretion 
in the Department of Employment Security to compromise any 
portion of such a claim. 
The summary of weekly benefits received by Plain-
tiff herein is included in the Record as page 8, and set 
forth herein as Appendix page 2. The question is raised 
thereunder of the correctness of the calculation of the 
amounts allegedly due from plaintiff to the Department of 
Employment Security. 
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POINT I: THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO 
DENY BENEFITS BASED UPON RETROACTIVE DISQUALIFICATION OF 
PLAINTIFF AND TO THEREBY REQUIRE REPAYMENT OF AMOUNTS 
RECEIVED IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSES OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION LAWS AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND AMOUNTS TO 
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
This appeal presents the issue as to the proper 
interpretation and application of Utah Statutes regarding 
Unemployment Compensation pursuant to Chapter 4, Title 35, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953* and specifically examines the 
application of 35-4-5 (e) and 35-4-6 (d) and (e) to the 
facts of this case. 
It has long been established that public policy 
underlying Unemployment Compensation is as follows: 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious 
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people 
of this state. ... subject requiring action by legis-
lature to prevent its spread and to lighten the burden 
upon the unemployed worker.... social security requires 
protection against this greatest hazard of our eco-
nomic life. ... the public good, and the general welfare 
...require ..free? public employment offices and for., 
compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be 
used for the benefit of unemployed persons." J[/ 
1. Utah Code Annotated 35-4-2 
5 
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This principle was recently reaffirmed in the 
case of California Department of Human Resources Development 
vs> Java. 2/ The Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the congressional objective in enacting Sec.301-303 of 
the Social Security Act (42 USC Sec 501-503) was to provide 
for wages lost during a period of unemployment not the employee1s 
fault. 2j The Java decision contains a cogent analysis of 
the purposes and objectives of the Unemployment Compensation 
system, and emphasizes the close interrelationship between 
the States and the Federal Government in funding the benefits 
available for unemployed workers. 
The Supreme Court of California recently construed 
the statute of that State allowing the state to recover an 
overpayment of unemployment benefits in the light of the 
Java decision. 4/ The California Court held that the statute 
providing that any person overpaid unemployment benefits is 
liable for the amount overpaid unless the overpayment was 
received without fault on the part of the recipient, and its 
recovery would be against equity and good conscience, does 
not permit recoupment of overpayment on sole ground that 
recipient had been notified of possibility of liability but 
also requires consideration of the nature and cause of the 
overpayment, the hardship to the recipient that repayment may 
2. 402 U.S. 121, 28 L. Ed. 2d 666, 91 S. Ct. 1347 (1971) 
3. Ibid, at page 130 of 402 U.S. Reports 
4. Gilles vs. Department of Human Resources Development 
113 Cal. Rptr. 374, 521 P. 2d 110, (1974) 
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impose, and the effect, if any, that repayment would have 
upon the fulfillment of the objectives of the unemployment 
compensation laws, and further holding that the statute per-
mitting collection of overpayments by setoff against future 
unemployment benefits does not conflict with the Social Sec-
urity Act. In Gilles the issue involved whether employee 
discharged for alleged misconduct, and having been found initially 
elgible, was entitled to receive benefits pending determination 
of appeal by employers, and whether, in event of adverse 
determination of elgibility on appeal, were required to repay 
amounts received as overpayment^. J>/ 
The Court found support in federal court decisions 
construing section 204 of the Social Security Act (42 USC 
Sec. 404) > which prohibits recovery of overpayments from"any 
person who is without fault if such adjustment or recovery 
would defeat the purpose of this subchapter or would be 
against equity and good conscience." j6/ It is clear that 
the federal decisions require that there be taken into account 
the origin of the overpayment, the extent to which the recip-
ient changes his position in reliance on the receipt of benefits, 
and the impact of recoupment upon the recipientfs current 
financial position. 
5. Ibid, 521 P. 2d at page 115. 
6. Ibid, 52 1 P. 2d at page 117* and cases and decisions cited. 
7 
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In Gilles, supra, it is expressly stated"that 
the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code must be 
liberally construed to further the legislative objectives." jj 
And the Court cites with approval language from Java, supra 
regarding the objectives of Unemployment benefits, which in-
clude providing cash to a newly unemployed worker at a time 
when otherwise he would have nothing to spend, serving to main-
tain the recipient at subsistence levels without the necessity 
of his turning to welfare or private charity, and emphasizing 
that the early payment of insurance benefits serves to pre-
vent a decline in the purchasing power of the unemployed, 
which in turn serves to aid industries producing goods and 
services. 8/ 
In the case at bar, a careful review of the record 
reveals that plaintiff herein was apparently confused and 
unsure of his obligations under the reporting requirements, 
and consistently denied making false statements or intentional 
omissions for purposes of gaining benefits to which he was 
not entitled. It further appears that plaintiff was not 
given notice that he could be required to make full repayment 
of amounts received subsequent to May 31, 197 5, to date, at 
the initial interview on January 7, 1976. It appears that 
his sole reason to seek benefits was due to the nature of 
his employment, something which is common to many members of 
trade unions employed in the construction industry, namely, 
~ Ibid, at 521 P. 2d at page 118. 
3. Ibid. 
8 
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periods of regular employment for several weeks or jnonth^, 
usually terminating for periods of several weeks due to a 
reduction in force or temporary layoffs, before again finding 
regular employment. There is no question that plaiptiff was 
in fact unemployed during each of the weeks subsequent to 
May 31> 1975* when he applied for benefits; and it is equally 
clear that plaintiff was unaware of any reason why those benefits 
could be later determined to have been "overpaid." 
It is submitted that any overpayments allegedly 
received by plaintiff were receivedMwithout fault" as defined 
and within the meaning of 35-4-6(e) and it is further submitted 
that plaintiff was entirely without fault in requesting benefits 
and is otherwise entitled to same, without liability for 
repayment of any kind. Plaintiff's unemployment was clearly 
due to no fault of his own. 
A recent decision by the Commonwealth Court of Penn-
sylvania held a statute of that state,which is similar to the 
Utah Statute allowing recoupment of overpayments, to violate 
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and to 
violate the equal protection clause, as applied in that case, j)/ 
The facts are similar, in that the claimant was initially 
found elgible for benefits, but that information subsequently 
developed from the employer revealed that claimant had appar-
ently voluntarily left work. Upon discovery of the error, the 
liability for overpayment was assessed seeking recovery of 
benefits previously paid. That Court also cites with approval 
9. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review vs. Selby, 
Pa. Cmwlth., 360 A2d 2 54 (1976) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the public policy considerations enunciated in Java, supra, 
and Gilles, supra/ 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the interpretation 
by the Industrial Commission, through its various hearing 
representatives, referees, and the Board of Review, of 35-4-5 
U.C.A, 1953> as evidenced by its procedures, and by its decisions 
in this case, offend the Constitutional and statutory principles 
hereinabove set forth. 
The determination that plaintiff is inelgible for 
any future benefits until the sum of $1,217.00 is repaid, and 
is further subject to collection through civil process in the 
same manner as any other judgment debtor, is erroneous, and 
should be set aside by this court. 
POINT II: THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
The record in this matter is clear that plaintiff 
has a great deal of difficulty with the English language. It 
further appears that there was a considerable delay in the 
notice given plaintiff that the Department of Employment 
Security was seeking recoupment of a substantial sum from 
plaintiff. The hearings were investigated, adjudicated, ana 
reviewed by a single agency. It has been held that in at 
least some instances this amounts to a denial of due process 
of lawj where there is a power to discipline and a power 
to investigate, a medical board did not qualify as an 
* ^ -4--i «-i unmaker. 10/ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although the Department of Employment Security 
concedes that the consequences of disqualification are harsh 
and severe, it is contended that the statute allows no 
discretion. It is submitted that the provisions of the 
statute allow for such discretion, and that fundamental 
fairness required by law is violated in not resolving 
contested questions raised by the evidence in favor of the 
plaintiff. If, in fact, the disqualification is result of 
the failure to understand the duties imposed by law on the 
part of the plaintiff, the result becomes harsh indeed. 
There is precedent that cruel and unusual penalties 
are a violation of the Constitution of the United States 11/ 
and apply as well toncivil"penalties as to those imposed 
through the criminal statutes. There can be no dispute 
that the application of the fraud provisions of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation statute is in the nature of a 
penalty. The penalty may not be justified in terms of 
public policy due to the adverse impact on the plaintiff 
financially, causing great hardship. Nor may it be justified 
due to the apparent unjust enrichment ttetderives in favor 
of the State. 
*±^ u.s. const. Amend. VIII; Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1948) 
CONCLUSION 64 Harv. L. Rev. 271(1950) 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the decision 
rendered by the Board of Review is erroneous and should 
be reversed and otherwise set aside, and that plaintiff be 
declared elgible to receive future benefits, if qualified and 
elgible, and that the requirement for repayment of "over-
paymentn be set aside. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 
UTAH DEPT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
JZ : t ' > 
S'jA NO J.l2_. 1 d-ih-7'J EFFECTIVE DATt aALT LAKI: i^ilTirJj IOCAI Off ICE DATE PROCESSED S MAILED 
01 
1 73 ! n / j 
* ?-J , n. 
1 75 I tV j 
">>K WVEPU Sil>f) 
WAGE 5 
YOUR WAGES .BY.1MPI-OYER BY CALENDAR QUARTER IN YOUR BASE PERJOD 
"EMPIOYER 
•f -il.d'--
'r / 1 . -r' t 
.•1 ^ H , '3 i 
•'• 7C , «•> -
|HrtA CJ"ST 
'.1KLA-.M r u N S I 
c A . f M ' l n j f ' S ! 
CUKT ST i A:jSli:•! M 
• ' l i f - i : i . ' ' K M " 
CAI. i L'-iv f.V JT • U ' l 
'• 7 + 
? 7u 
1 / ; . 
IOTAI WAGES 
1 : i . - . l f 
HIGH QTB WAGES WEEKS 
I» f.'.Vi!..,.A i J _ i t l 5 - U X Z L l j 
OR you DO Nor QUALIFY BECAUSC- . _ 
^1 f ! : L ^ r j n s T 
A«n'vjp ? i c K t r r 
JA^H!<St ,» C i r ;>T 
MAXIMUM BENEFITS 
.1J>*1<L_ L . l O i . 
WEEKLY 
AMOUNT 
NOTICE OF MONETARY Of TERMINATION FORM 605, REV. M -66 
UU.h DEW-ktMENT.Of E^iilUYMtMl SECURITY 
Ti'.i. other J::.^ of fh.s r. iv' ' K - y . IK; *«... ••.!/ C T A O ; ond rho r-M, 'V'.,:vi cn .o t ' i t v/t i.h you n\ iy be entitled to receive. These amounts are 
based en .•ununys SMCM ir-t* employee you purtec- ' J u'- You.- be,:cjf;ff. ' c h • b iseci en employment with private industry covered by State 
law, mil i tc.y se.vi-.-1 ., f t > - J civ., ^n <'mu y u> ,* c < ma th< fo..r r ' ; i f ! !(:»• mier 'd u *,«, ' r f .-•- • p-ior to effective date of your claim. 
UnerMploynu' t be*-.of :. -Jie pcyv;r 'c o. ' / it ^ n qualify P J J I week You will net tereive a wait ing week credit or benefit checks for any 
week fi for wf.-di ;C<, <. e r . . t "I w:lfi.» the lev*. v o u will receive u separ^o notification of a n / disqualif ication assessed. 
This • , n<;-; n aval ' ••.!..'« 1 J ;-cu W.''! I the 52 weeks followir-g the effective date of your cla.m. 
Refer to yo»'. Ma*'.'beck f t i Claim.; h. and Br of f S-..hedui<:\' for further explanation of trie law, your responsibilities, and how your 
benefit amount wo' ; J f ' . -W, •. •••.;. 
In th ' : ever.' \-. u d:> > •: r. j j ' i ' i iy, tne r t a , m is ^ o w r It is possible yoc r < ; 9 ^ qualify at the beginning o* the next calendar quarter. Contact your 
local office if >o-.« ha t au«die ,i 
if yc .• do no* r *"- ,v.:h • : , oVfe. M.aton of
 fcvt be'iefd ?.-^ ht:> you u, file a plates* through tf-^ Employment Security Office at which 
you fi led VOL/' !a i v i >' , : ><
 r . !0"?? ! musi be mode within 10 days from the d;jte on wh'ch this notice was processed and mailed to you. Bring 
this determine)?' r t v> v- .-.•>.; 
C: Ai7,'. \NT S f-Gr 'TS TO TRUEST FECONS !DEf?ATlON OF INFORMATION FURNSHFD BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 
Information ac K: • h, ' *:r you | c; f.;nn.:.:-j Fecier.-jl Ntrvice the arr-cuft.1 r f ycu. Fc . ' v c l %aacs, the period of your Federal services and 
the reason for sepcro • ;; * ' , ' • ; Federal :r.-vice cv-(-. : \ ' ; ; - .hed by ff"e Fedr.-.-il a cr:y for v-hcr. y ; u w c k e d . 
it ycj b«.'!ie\- •}.'.. *---,^a»icn fur^•••.hc.v '. r3* cjrrec* 0- >< >J wc • • rio 0 i--formatic • cLot.;t ,-;i ^ of the items, you have the right to request 
addi t ional ir.fcrmaNon c r r onsiderat'o^. 
Any ruch r rn i .c^ , '• ' « •.: : * ; 4 ' - Q . h ' ; ; . 'he--. '! be n-.ud*-- ?h'?-.. ; tk f f •••^;'- /;.:«?."• Secv-'ty OU - -:t which your claim was filed within ten day , 
from the ricfe this "^1.*r : ••••.•'••;-d 'c VOJ . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
"04/19/76 CLAIMANT RECORD TRANSCRIPT SM 
322 46 8015 
VITO.DIPHIZIO 
P 0 BOX 691 
SALT LAKE CY UT 84101 
12 15 74 93 2325 21 I 
12 13 75 18 1 
1511 860381026 39 2784 8156 
I 5E 05 25 75 05 22 76 1 1217 
II 23 75 12 21 74 12 06 75 12 27 ?4 12 19 74 
000000 
000000 
922650 
077710 
098870 
117538 
127031 
152588 
166036 
185129 
209081 
226261 
248822 
294966 
31 4448 
33289 1 
352326 
410815 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
01 
02 
02 
02 
02 
03 
03 
03 
04 
04 
04 
04 
05 
06 
06 
07 
14 
22 
30 
04 
13 
19 
25 
04 
10 
17 
01 
08 
14 
2\ 
12 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
~~436732 05 20 
450135 
467546 
571128 
623579 
651147 
939585 
961465 
05 
06 
07 
07 
08 
12 
12 
27 
02 
10 
29 
06 
02 
10 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
12 
12 
01 
01 
01 
01 
02 
02 
02 
02 
03 
03 
03 
03 
04 
04 
04 
05 
21 
28 
04 
11 
18 
25 
01 
08 
15 
22 
01 
08 
15 
29 
05 
12 
19 
10 
5 05 17 
05 
05 
07 
07 
08 
11 
12 
24 . 
31y 
05 
26 
02 
29 
06 
ww 
EE 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 1 
93 
80 
93 
93 
93 
EX i 
93 
9 3 
92 
93-
ROr 
45 
EX I 
93 
93 
SL 
ISS 
REM 
NOT 
93 
93 
1 
48 
99 
25 
r A til7. 5 3 
~?/ 
60 
HA i-OR WE 
11 23 5 S 
STP NO 5 
SUITED 
......... 
/'aE 5 25 5-5 
76-i -233 
7 19 
EP 
22 6 
UI - 154 FED 'a 
~? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
